Reaction Paper #5

Readings: “Descent into Chaos” Chapters 7-9

            This part of “Descent into Chaos” focuses on Afghanistan immediately after full combat operations ended in 2002. In the aftermath there was a precarious shift of power. The US needed to hand over a government to the country, but none existed. Instead, Rumsfeld and the Department of Defense decided to hand over governing power to the autonomous tribal leaders. The first major problem if this method was that most of the leaders had ties with the Taliban. This warlord authority Rashid considered to be Rumsfeld’s most fatal mistake. Rumsfeld had almost unlimited power in this regard, and he acted independently of the rest of the administration. However, he used the CIA’s $1 Billion Budget to fund the warlords. In retrospect it was clear that he was really indirectly just funding Taliban leaders, and was holding back and even reversing Afghan reconstruction. In June 2002 Karzai was elected President by a Loya Jirga in Germany.[i] He still had no power, however, because at this point the military had only secured Kabul, and had no political control over the rest of the country. To this day, Karzai is still only a glorified Mayor of Kabul.

            In Pakistan, Musharraf continued toeing the line between the Taliban and The US.  The ISI continued to be somewhat lukewarm in its support of the US while conducting double dealings with Al Qaida leaders in Afghanistan and the tribal regions of Pakistan. They were attempting to secure their survival whichever way the chips fell. It should have been clear to them that the US would refuse to stop until it achieved victory or it didn’t have any soldiers left (proof lies in Vietnam) so it was more in their interest to completely support the US in their endeavors even if it only meant that the US would be out of there sooner. But ideology drives a hard bargain. The Taliban and Al Qaida mindsets had so infiltrated the ISI by this point that they were practically the same group. [ii] This was clear especially in the Killing of Daniel Pearl in 2002 and the wave of terror attacks that followed. [iii] Their anti-American party called Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal flourished in Pakistan, though the Political system there is basically the ISI, it is highly doubtful that, had there been fair and free elections un-tampered with by the government, the same outcome would have occurred. Because of the uncooperative actions of Pakistan, the US expanded their bases in the region Central Asia to other countries, especially Uzbekistan.[iv]

            President Bush missed his opportunity for nation building because his leadership skills were lacking. He let a key directive expire that would have enacted an interagency process to rebuild Afghanistan.[v]  Despite the minor success of a few programs, the real hindrances were the CIA and DOD and their failure to cooperate with one another.[vi] If our own US government cannot coordinate together within itself or with other NATO or UN countries to solve a key problem threatening the safety of the US military, and by extension the American people, then I have no idea how they ever expected to have any success building another nation with Afghanistan’s history and political and social climate.[vii]

Viewings: “Kill/Capture” – PBS Frontline

            On May 2^nd, 2011, The US Special Operatives of Team 6, part of the Joint Special Operations Command had one of the highest profile successes of the Kill/Capture program since its inception. They raided a compound in Pakistan and killed Osama Bin Laden. Kill/Capture was a US strategy devised to keep the enemy on the run and to prevent them from gaining any stronghold territory. Under this system more than 12,000 militants per year have been either killed or are in US custody. But sometimes intelligence is wrong, and sometimes they raid the homes of supporters by accident. Not only does that result in the death of innocent people, but it makes locals dislike the US military. Especially Afghan soldiers who are ashamed to raid the homes of tribal elders. What the overall strategy is trying to do is make friends with the local people to isolate the insurgents, but is that what they’re really doing?

The US military believes in killing people, but only the right people. They are getting better and better at identifying and isolating the real enemy: the individual terrorist members of Al Qaida. General McChrystal increased kill/capture missions and Petraeus continued to use them even more frequently. The raids themselves are mostly run by JSOC Special Forces such as the Navy Seals or 101^st Airborne because they exist outside of NATO limits. This leaves conventional forces to secure populace, theoretically. It has worked in many places- there’s no more Taliban in many towns in Afghanistan. Still many feel it is offensive and violates Islamic values, traditions, and code by violating women and breaking and entering. Even the most US- friendly Afghan soldiers oppose night raids because they feel it is offensive in their country. The US army tries to reduce offense by using locals from the Afghan army instead of Americans.

 It even goes so far to make some support the Taliban instead. Many tribal elders and small militias have either returned to Taliban control or are openly sympathetic to the Taliban. An even bigger problem is when the US makes a mistake. One time, a drone missile hit an election convoy instead of the terrorists. The US military maintained that they had killed the right person, but there is no way to oversee if they make a mistake. Just because they think someone is a terrorist, doesn’t mean they’re right – intelligence mistakes cost lives. Furthermore, they don’t have to approve their targets with the government in Kabul, so there are some mistakes that could have been avoided by including the Kabul government in their decisions. More mistakes mean more Afghans will go to the Taliban side. Lots of Taliban are being killed successfully but there are always more Taliban soldiers waiting to take over. It’s impossible to get rid of people that are ready and willing to die anyway, with nearly unlimited human resources. And the more the US makes ordinary citizens the victims, the more support the Taliban will get. Even people who left the Taliban regret doing so, because the Kabul government can’t support them monetarily like the Taliban could. Both sides, the independent militias on the government side and the ones that openly support the Taliban, seem to think the Americans are the infidels instead.

 “Return of the Taliban” – PBS Frontline

           

After the Taliban and Al Qaida were driven out of Afghanistan in 2001, they regrouped in Peshawar, on the border of the tribal territories in Pakistan. These areas now have full Taliban influence, since the tribal areas operate autonomously from the Pakistani state. Here, the Taliban have regrouped and reformed, and Pakistan is doing almost nothing to stop them. Nor does it appear to want to. Musharraf attempts to play both sides by supporting the US, while allowing the ISI almost complete power to support the Taliban so as not to alienate his political support. This kind of toeing the line is only possible for a very short while. In the tribal regions the support for the Taliban and Al Qaida is completely open. Mosques even held collections to support the groups when the US first went into Afghanistan and collected gold, silver, cash, and weapons.

Pakistan did not cooperate with US completely at first or for awhile after the start of the war – to could have possibly been the final thing that undermined the US’s whole Afghanistan mission and could explain why the US is still fighting in Afghanistan ten years later. Pakistan has basically cut their own deals with Al Qaida and the Taliban under the US’s nose. The introduction of suicide bombing and Arab money into the Taliban and Al Qaida can largely be blamed on Pakistan effectively supporting them throughout the whole game. When it comes down to it, it appears Pashtun brotherhood is stronger than any political system. But that doesn’t mean they want the general Pakistani or American public to know about their double dealing. Hayat Ullah was one of many journalists killed because he implicated the Pakistani government as supporting the Americans in drone bombings of Taliban leaders. He published images of found US missiles at the site of an explosion that killed a Taliban bomb maker. It disproved what the Pakistani government had originally stated- that it was an accidental explosion. It could have undermined Musharraf and the ISI’s dealings with the Taliban. Since then, Karzai has attempted to politically force Musharraf into full support of the US, but has been relatively unsuccessful until very recently. Even Bush attempted to force Musharraf, but Bush’s political skills were too lacking to win him over. Despite all of this Musharraf is still only reasonable ally in the region, and so the US is stuck with him for awhile.

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[i] Rashid 144

[ii] Rashid 151

[iii] Rashid 157

[iv] Rashid 168

[v] Rashid 173

[vi] Rashid 185

[vii] Rashid 195