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Friday, December 9, 2011

Reaction Paper #8


1.      Rashid- Chapters 16-19
Chapter 16 discusses the war’s affect on the central Asian region in general. The USSR left a vacuum which resulted in huge wealth gaps. Kyrgyzstan became more politically totalitarian since 9/11. The dictator, Askar Akayev, justified it by saying it was necessary due to the increased threat of terrorism, but it’s impossible to ignore his personal economic and political power gain by playing the dictator card. In Turkmenistan a similar trend occurred. The president closed public facilities, restricted health care, and limited education and the media, all in the name of fighting extremism. It is worth questioning, however, that besides the likely corruption, these Islamic countries may have just been attempting to conform more to Taliban and Al Qaida views of Islam, government, and human rights in an effort to protect themselves. Instead of fighting the Taliban, they were really just reducing their probability of being a target. Uzbekistan starts out following a similar pattern, but to an even greater extent, due to an economic collapse soon after 9/11 and the added bonus of significantly increasing the pay of the police and military forces. The dictator, Karmov, is a skilled ruthless politician and quickly began playing the two powers USA and Russia off against each other. The practical result of which was the US was kicked out of Uzbekistan, making it more difficult to mount military operations in the region. The moral of this story is that Al Qaida and 9/11 increased political and economic repression of fellow Muslims, just as much as they hurt the west.
            In chapter 17, Rashid discusses the role of Pakistan in Al Qaida and the Taliban’s resurgence between 2005 and 2006. It became clear to US and NATO forces that both groups had effective control over the Pakistani military, the tribal areas, and some of the political parties. Al Qaida established their central command in Pakistan to plan attacks on US forces in Afghanistan. Taliban and Al Qaida fighters would simply cross the border, carry out their offensives, and return to safety in Pakistan where the US could not follow them. The resulting political pressure between NATO, Bush, and Musharraf over who was responsible for dealing with the groups and which country they were actually in since the border in that area is not well defined. Eventually NATO gained the upper hand politically and began to use NATO forces to take over parts of the Pakistani government, the afghan government and local areas. However, due to the NATO constitutions and the governments of member countries, many of these forces were very limited. Of the NATO members, only UK and Canadian forces in addition to the US forces really accomplished anything meaningful, despite the fact that they faced a stronger Taliban than expected. It turned out to be too little too late.
Chapter 18 talks about the crumbling of the Pakistani state, which really had been troubled for a long time, but especially began to fall apart under Musharraf. All liberal or moderate policies, though supported by the Supreme Court, could not be enforced unless Musharraf and the military did so, and the military and ISI were basically their own government. Whenever Musharraf finally got around to protecting his own people using the military, Al Qaida would retaliate violently. The political flip flopping on Musharraf’s part went from making deals with Jihadists to supporting the Americans throughout 2006 and 2007. He was literally incapable of choosing a side and sticking to it, showing he was not one to think for himself, and simply responded to pressure from either side. He even made a deal with Benazir Bhutto to share power, in an attempt to gain some legitimacy. He went back and forth between supporting democracy and suffrage to declaring martial law depending on what suited him at the time. Bhutto ended up being shot while campaigning against Musharraf, which resulted in her becoming something of a martyr for the Pakistani People’s Party and they swept the elections.  Back in Afghanistan, there was no success on the NATO side because their forces were limited and they had no strategy. The Taliban had no problem outlasting NATO.
Rashid’s conclusion in Chapter 19 discusses Pakistan after the elections in 2008, where there was established a coalition government led by the liberal and moderate parties, though this later broke down. Pakistan faces economic collapse, energy shortages, human rights crises and disintegrating relations with many nations thanks to Musharraf’s political failures. Gilani, the new president, launched a military offensive, but the military brokered a deal with the militants of their own accord without the consent of the government, proving that the military was too powerful. The peace treaty didn’t even stop attacks by Al Qaida anywhere else besides the tribal areas. By 2008 the Taliban was fairly strong again and was putting up a good guerilla fight against the US and NATO, who had the least success and highest casualty rate since 2001. The mounting cost due to the required troop surge by Obama by now had become ridiculously high. Which, combined with the US’s own economic collapse, caused quite a crisis for the US government. The lack of progress in Afghanistan meant the loss of foreign investors which paralyzed the already destroyed Afghanistan economy.

2.      “The War Briefing”
“The War Briefing” discusses the state of the war in Afghanistan in the fall of 2008 during the election. In 2008 the Taliban was resurging supported by bases in Pakistan. The most dangerous area is in the Korengal, mountain passes along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan used for smuggling by terrorists. It is very rugged terrain and extremely dangerous. The situation in Afghanistan had been deteriorating since 2006 and the number of attacks on the US reached a high in 2008. After he was elected, Obama immediately planned to remove troops from Iraq and have a troop surge in Afghanistan, despite the talk of ending both wars. The soldiers in Afghanistan, especially in Korengal, were very poorly protected for doing such dangerous work. There was a much higher death rate than necessary.
The Taliban was growing because of propaganda, and the failure of the Kabul government to have any control over surrounding and remote territories. The fear of Taliban takeover is truly dangerous, and could make the already feeble economy collapse completely. One of the main causes of these problems is that, back in 2001, there was never enough military to completely defeat the Taliban at the time, Instead the US military and CIA just pushed them aside into Pakistan where they found more people and funds from the drug trade and adopted ideology from Al Qaida. The US made a fundamental mistake when it attempted to wage a war, reconstruct a country, and run a government all at the same time, especially with limited resources. The US has yet to replace the Taliban with any real authority or justice system, so a power vacuum will be created if the US ever leaves. The main current problem (as of 2008) is that there aren’t enough troops to go around. This forces the US military to use more air strikes and drone strikes which unfortunately have a much higher civilian death rate and destroy more property than troops on the ground. The locals don’t like this obviously so this forces many of them to the Taliban’s side. This growing alliance between the locals and the Taliban is breakable though. It is estimated that only 1-2% would never negotiate with the military. The vast majority of them only want things in return.
            In Pakistan, the Taliban and Are Qaida are and will remain safe. No national government had every controlled or occupied the tribal areas in Pakistan even all the way back to the British in the 1800s and before. Their alliance with the ISI strengthens them. The ISI worry that without the Taliban, Afghanistan will fall under India’s influence, which is not helped by the fact that Karzai is very openly pro-India. The ISI practically openly claims support for Al Qaida, almost as an insurance policy, because the Pakistani army would be no match for them and the Taliban. Instead they make deals and alliances to protect themselves. Each time a deal is made it becomes much worse for the US army in the field, who isn’t allowed to cross into Pakistan. When drones kill one Taliban leader, a new one simply rises up into his place. Furthermore, Al Qaida and the Taliban are no longer sticking to just the tribal areas. They are slowly pushing out, beginning to infiltrate other parts of Pakistan which is in grave danger of becoming a failed state with a good deal of nuclear weapons. Pakistan collapsing would be the worst possible thing for the region. Bhutto’s assassination is a great example of how the liberal and moderate Pakistani stability is being defeated. Now Musharraf is gone, and Bhutto’s husband is in power, but it still a weak government. If America pushes too hard it could lose Pakistan completely.
3.       “Wiki Secrets”
Wiki Secrets is the story of Bradley Manning and Julian Assange. Bradley Manning was an intelligence analyst for the army in Iraq, who had high security clearance and a lot of disillusionment with the Army and the government. Julian Assange was the founder of WikiLeaks, the whistle blowing website that publishes top secret information when their anonymous sources send it to them with the goal of transparency in the government.
            Bradley Manning was a product of the information, like everyone born between 1985 onward, he was used to and okay with sharing personal information with the general public via Facebook, twitter, blogging, and chatting. Like all members of this generation, they had grown up hating secrets. Bradley was very smart and proud of being entrusted with such information, but he was also gay in the military, at the height of the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Policy. The military, unlike Bradley’s generation, is very fond of secrets, especially personal ones about sexual orientation. It is very likely that DADT plays a large role in this story. Though Bradley never had the right mentality for subordination or obedience, he was sent to Iraq anyway, despite his history of acting out and depression. He was given access to the largest secure area in Iraq and was able to download thousands and thousands of files without anyone noticing (which says a great deal about cyber security in the US military).
No one can really prove how the information found its way to wikileaks. The site goes through a lot to protect its sources, even from wikileaks staff. The only difference here is that it looks as though Julian Assange may have solicited some of the material after being directly in contact with manning, which is illegal and considered espionage. Getting caught was really Bradley’s own fault though. He confessed everything via chat to a hacker that he had never actually met before. The Hacker turned him in. If the information made it to Wiki leaks the normal way, Julian Assange cannot be blamed, but evidence points to the fact that Assange and Manning were communicating by other means.
So the question is: Is Bradley manning good or bad. Was he a whistle blower or a traitor? The leaked documents had a great deal of impact around the world, and at least partially fueled the Arab spring of this past year. It definitely at least proves that one (or two) people can change the world.
4.      “Ahmed Rashid and Dexter Filkins on Charlie Rose”
Ahmed Rashid and Dexter Filkins both appeared on Charlie Rose this past summer. They described how Afghanistan is still deteriorating despite the troop surge as of august 2011.  The Taliban is escalating, but are supposedly in talks with the US. The problem is some Taliban are willing to negotiate but others aren’t: the ones with closer ties to Al Qaida. The US isn’t giving much ground though. The historical point of view that “We don’t negotiate with terrorists” applies, but this may result in the US digging themselves into quite a diplomatic hole. Slowly, though, they are starting to separate the Taliban from Al Qaida though, which is key. The more military action there is the more it undermines negotiations. The problem is there will always be more Taliban soldiers but the surge troops are ending their tours of duty. The insurgents could theoretically just bide their time and run the clock out until the US is exhausted from war. When Americans leave, the Taliban will return to how they were before we came, or even worse. The US hasn’t built anything constructive governmentally or infrastructure-wise so nothing will last—we are destined to have the same fate as the soviets unless something changes.
The Taliban are killing the government officials, taking a toll on the government. There is no strong government to transition to so there will be a power vacuum. The government as it is remains pretty unpopular due to corruption, and it causes people to support the Taliban. The Taliban may rule by fear- but at least they don’t demolish villages. The policy used by the Afghanistan government comes out of the CIA and The Pentagon, not the white house or state department which does not set a good precedent for peace. There is an age gap developing in the Taliban in recent years. The older ones may have changed a bit and are no longer burning down schools. They seem willing to negotiate. The new younger Taliban have close ties with Al Qaida and are more ideologically militant and not at all willing to negotiate anything.  
In Pakistan, after Osama Bin Laden was killed the military was embarrassed and demoralized which is dangerous because they were really the only functioning part of the state. The Pakistani military controls over 120 nuclear warheads, so if the government collapses nukes are a problem. Another attack in India supported by ISI would be even worse, because India would most definitely invade Pakistan- which could very probably result in nuclear war. Pakistan’ relations with US are fairly bad at the moment, and they were made worse by the killing of Bin Laden. The military is also over extended, the economy is in trouble, and ethnic issues are still causing tension. Pakistan needs better US relations to save itself, but US isn’t doing much on that front. The State department needs to reform a bond with Pakistan for the stability of the region, though it’s easy to see why they wouldn’t want to because Pakistan has been double dealing them the whole time.
5.      “The Triple Agent”
The Triple Agent was a short video describing the Al Qaida triple agent who managed to infiltrate the CIA then use a suicide bomb to kill several CIA officers. The man was a Jordanian doctor, who was a grown man with children: not the typical profile of ideologically warped 20 year olds who feel disillusioned with the world. It was the biggest CIA incident since the cold war. He became an informant for the CIA, but he supported about Al Qaida and even blogged about his support for Al Qaida under an assumed name. No American had ever actually met him, so he should have been considered at least a nominal threat. Nevertheless, the CIA neglected its typical safety protocol in these situations and they paid the price.
6.       “John Meacham on Memorial Day”
John Meacham offers an opinion piece about memorial day, arguing that the American Public are completely detached from war, despite the fact that more people think war is sometimes necessary. Today less than 0.5% of Americans are active duty officers. Americans are very disconnected from the military because they don’t know anyone who is a soldier. Modern America has no concept of what it actually means to fight a war, so we don’t pay attention to it and don’t care. It is a completely different mentality than the Total War concept of WWII or even the heavy protesting of the draft during the Vietnam War. Today war is just like a video game with excellent graphics. Meacham argues that if we want to be successful we need to relearn what war really means and how to fight it from the home front.

7.      7. New Yorker Article
The New Yorker article we read argues that the US was so shocked by 9/11 that America never formed into the industrial state needed to retaliate and defeat the enemy. It just became static, which is no way for an economy to behave during war time. The article gives examples of how US soldiers are not properly protected and how there are not enough troops. The stagnant economy between 2001 and 2008 when it collapsed had no distinct increase of production even in the military sector, while soldiers were still being poorly protected with substandard equipment in the field.  There were simply no investors to fund mass production of new military equipment because 9/11 shocked and froze the US whose citizens would otherwise have seen a great business opportunity.
8.       “The Interrogator/The Agent” – (Together since they are about the same thing)
Both stories begin with the suicide bombing of the USS Cole, which was supposed to be indestructible. The operation was carried out by Al Qaida in 2000 in Yemen. It was only the second attack by Al Qaida on Americans after the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. At the time, only 8 FBI agents in America spoke Arabic. Ali Soufan, an FBI agent in New York and a protégé of John O’Neill, was the only Arabic Speaker in the city. He was sent to Yemen to head the investigation of the USS Cole bombing. He, like O’Neill, understood the threat Al Qaida posed to America though very few others shared their belief.
            It is clear in both the article and the documentary that Soufan really understood Arabic and Muslim culture, coming from the inside. He was the most successful in handling interrogations and negotiations because he had a complete understanding not just about the facts of the culture but also the history and reasoning behind them that other Americans have never  been able to fully grasp. Soufan grew up in Jordan as a Muslim, and moved to Pennsylvania at 16. The USS Cole investigation lead to the potential for the discovery of the 9/11 plot, but no American agency was able to prevent it because of “The Wall”. No one in the government ever wanted to share their intelligence, for multiple reasons the strongest of which was of course political power. All it takes are a few people who care only about the politics to slow down the whole operation. This is why transparency is so important. Literally, the CIA sharing a picture with the FBI could have prevented 9/11, the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars and the economic collapse. The world would be very different today. Soufan learned how to break down walls between him and the terrorists he interrogated with respect and education on both sides. Why can’t the government learn the same lesson?
Interrogation is about building chemistry and trust. Soufan was also a leading interrogator at Guantanamo. He was more effective than the DOD or CIA who were using torture methods. Thus, he is very opposed to torture methods, thought it’s important that he opposes them because they don’t work. He says if they did work and saved lots of lives, he might support them.

9.      Class discussions
I know I haven’t done these in awhile, because usually when we discuss relevant things, the substance of the discussion is contained in the other sections of my paper, but this class we had a lively discussion of the reasons why the US is failing in Afghanistan and what should be done about it. Several people put forward good arguments that the rotating soldiers are preventing the growth of good relations with the locals as a main cause of American failure in rebuilding. Also it was noted that the government in place is basically useless and actually does more harm than good by violating rights of their own citizens forcing them to support the Taliban. We all agreed that the war was headed in a very bad direction but there was no consensus in how to proceed from here. Many advocated just pulling out immediately to cut American losses but this would majorly destabilize the region because a new civil war would likely immediately spring up. The main concern is Pakistan, who really can’t be trusted with their nuclear weapons. They are the real wild cards here. A few advocated invading Pakistan, but another invasion with the goal of removing a hostile government and nation building will get minimal support from the US. I think the best we can do is bolster relations with Pakistan as best as possible. Peace between Pakistan and India would do a great deal of good in the region, and also help greatly in stabilizing the Afghanistan issue if Pakistan is not preoccupied with conspiracy theories about India wanting to take them over from both sides. Also, it is important to note that Iran cannot be discounted from this discussion because of their ties to Pakistan, offending both Pakistan and Iran (two unstable nations with nuclear weapons) is in no one’s best interest.

Tuesday, November 29, 2011

Reaction Paper #7


Readings: Rashid Chapters 14 and 15
Rashid makes it clear in Chapter 14 that the disregard for the Geneva Conventions was a major blow to US policy and international relations. The treatment of POWs is a serious issue in a post 9/11 world because the US is not fighting a country; they are fighting a collective group of people without national borders or laws. Al Qaida certainly never signed the Geneva conventions, so an argument can be made that the Geneva Conventions do not apply. However, this would be an irresponsible and anachronistic interpretation of the conventions. The US had a great opportunity to set a precedent for the role of the Geneva Conventions in modern warfare, but they squandered this opportunity with Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and the CIA network of foreign prisons. The neoconservative project of expanding the authority of the executive branch put the State Department, foreign policy and the Geneva Conventions second[i]. The Department of Defense and CIA were put first. In doing so, they set a precedent of war being the predominant international force instead of peaceful diplomacy. Very quickly, other countries like Pakistan began following the US’s lead in the treatment of POWs with disastrous results. The rampant human rights abuses in the region are the result of this ‘war first’ policy.[ii]
                In Chapter 15, Rashid moves on to the drug issues in the region. Afghanistan is the world’s largest producer of opiates, particularly the Helmand region. War is the primary cause of such rampant poppy production. The economy cannot support many other jobs, and the poppy industry funds the war, both for the northern alliance and for the Taliban and Al Qaida, so when war and terrorism thrive so does the poppy industry. The US and UK have not been able to address the poppy cultivation issue.[iii] But the blame also rests on the current Afghan government, especially Karzai.[iv] It is a complicated situation because poppy cultivation is a means of livelihood for many Afghan citizens, and it is extremely difficult to expand into other crops that are worth much less when sold. More about the drug trade will be discussed when I talk about “Bitter Harvest”.
Viewings: “The Dancing Boys of Afghanistan” – Frontline
                This documentary investigated the practice of Bacha Bazi in Afghanistan. Bacha Bazi translates to mean “boy play”; it’s a means of sex slavery of young boys in Afghanistan. It’s relevant to us now because of the recent events at Penn State. In a sense it has hit close to home. The history of Bacha Bazi goes back rather far in Afghanistan, though it is banned by both the Taliban and the Afghanistan government. It has a lot of similarities to the prostitution industry in America and Europe of women, except that here they are young boys, usually aged 9-16 or so. The boys are poor and are effectively purchased by wealthy warlords and business men as dancers. They dress in women’s clothing and dance for a gathering of wealthy men, not unlike a strip club in the US. They even sell DVDs of it on the streets. The entertainment is merely a pretense for the sexual acts that occur later. It is child abuse and rape- but what is the alternative for these boys? They earn money for their families this way. Again similar to the prostitutes on the streets in the US, they feel they have no other choice.
The Practice originated in Pakistan, and came to Afghanistan as a way to cope with war while soldiers were away in battle, particularly when fighting the Russians in the 80s. There is too much similar activity of pedophilia and illicit sex in the west to argue that it is simply a cultural difference. It could be argued that these men are like all men- men go to strip clubs and try to sleep with prostitutes all the time in western countries, the only difference in this case is the gender; even that (as Penn State proved) may not be that different (and that could just be a cultural difference--- must look at from the point of view of the culture). Since women are covered all the time, wandering eyes might go to young boys that still appear innocent and feminine. Furthermore it should be considered in the broader scope of Asian culture. The men who participate are all very rich and powerful – they must be to support all the boys. It’s a concubine type of culture that is fairly common throughout the history of Asia. They used young girls for such things all the time. Should there be a difference between them and young boys? Obviously that doesn’t make it right, but maybe we should be less surprised.
                The man in question in the video has two sons of his own, but he sees no connection between his sons and the boys he uses for sex. Perhaps it is a class or caste thing? Many of the men interviewed say they wouldn’t have sex with the boys if they didn’t want it—but they also say young boys want it a lot- probably out of fear that resisting could result in a beating or death. It is also possible that the hypothetical lack of resistance is psychological, or they are abusing the high hormone levels of teenage boys who have been exposed to the Bacha Bazi culture from a very young age and may not know any alternative.
The police do not stop the practices even though it is illegal. The police say that if anyone is caught in the act they will be punished—but they don’t actually do it. They are easily bribed and often participate in the practice themselves. The Chief of the youth crime department and the chief investigator of police in that area both participate in these activities. Furthermore, a lot of references to drinking and alcohol are present- but isn’t drinking alcohol against Islam? How do they reconcile that with their beliefs? Bacha Bazi is very taboo in the country—no one talks about it, but research by the UN shows that it is actually fairly widespread throughout the country, and has made a comeback since the fall of the Taliban. These young boys need income, and many have no other way of making money for their families. If they are raised this way what else would they know? Even boys who grew up as dancers talk of having their own boys one day, thus it is very hard to stop the cycle. It can be very dangerous for boys—masters have been known to beat or kill boys that disobey or attempt to run away. Trying to rescue them may put them in even more danger.

“Bitter Harvest” – PBS Wide Angle
70% of the world’s opium and heroin is grown in Afghanistan. Opium production has tripled since the fall of Taliban, overflowing into the rest of central Asia. Recently, since the destruction of the already precarious Afghan economy, Opium has become the only source of income in the country in a place where war has torn apart all other industries. It has funded the military campaigns on both sides for a long time. The farmers themselves don’t even make that much money from growing poppy. The big profits are for smugglers, who can get the drugs from the labs in northern Afghanistan to the markets in Europe and the Americas. Over 200 drug labs are thought to be hidden in the mountains in northern Afghanistan. Putting a stop to such a widespread organization is particularly difficult because there are no other reliable jobs in a country torn apart by war.
Drug control is financed by the UN, not the governments of the individual countries. Trying to stop transport across the afghan border is difficult for the UN with some collaboration from the national militaries because the drug smugglers are smarter and better funded than the border patrol. The topography of the area makes it especially difficult to police, even though there are still Russian forces policing in some areas. But it is hard and dangerous work for both the smugglers and the border patrol. The drugs are worth a lot more once they cross the border into Tajikistan and even more once they make it to Europe.  One truck load can be worth over $25 million on the streets of Europe. Everyone involved that was interviewed cited poverty as their reason for getting involved in the drug trade (and war is a large cause of the widespread poverty). Widespread corruption doesn’t help either. Authorities in Uzbekistan have been known to plant drugs and illegal literature on people they want to arrest for disagreeing with the Authoritarian dictatorship.
The drug trade supports terrorism, and the instability in Afghanistan causes instability in the entire region directly because of drugs. It is difficult to improve productivity, education, and peace when a large portion of the youth in a given country is addicted to heroin. The drug is literally destroying countries in its path to Europe. Ironically, it’s the same Silk Road that Marco Polo used to open up the economy of Europe to Asia. Now those roads are being used for destructive purposes.


[i] Rashid 293
[ii] Rashid 311
[iii] Rashid 325
[iv] Rashid 331

Friday, November 18, 2011

Reaction Paper #6


Readings- Rashid Chapters 10-13

            At a G8 conference in 2002, the US said that they would not participate in nation building in Afghanistan. They lied.[i] Soon the US was setting up a government, military, and police force. Provincial Reconstruction Teams were set up later as well, but proved to be ineffective, and equally as difficult to execute as setting up the government institutions. A lack of funding was a major cause, either because there wasn’t enough money to start or the money was misappropriated.[ii] The government has multiple factions and inconsistencies which result in an inefficiency bordering on anarchy to go along with the growing corruption within the state bureaucracy. It’s been discussed before that the president, Hamid Karzai, has no power outside Kabul, and minimal mandate throughout the country. Despite all of these roadblocks, a constitution was adopted in 2004.[iii] However, this constitution might not be the best for Afghanistan. Written with heavy western influence, it does not take into enough consideration the cultural history of the country, and its policies contribute to the displeasure of the Afghani populace, which in turn drives more and more to supporting the Taliban.

            The ridiculous double dealing of Pakistan emerges almost from the beginning of the fighting in Afghanistan in late 2001 an early 2002. The ISI continue nearly open support for the Taliban, and other groups associated with them as well as Al Qaida.[iv] In addition to the ISI, the Islamic political parties have also shown support for the Taliban, and continue to deny the existence of Al Qaida completely, maintaining that 9/11 was carried out by the CIA and Israel. Musharraf did not contradict them.[v] Coalition forces quickly realized that Pakistani military support would be more hindrance than help, because of their support of the enemy, in aiding border crossings, turning a blind eye to blatant Taliban and Al Qaida efforts, and refusing to share intelligence or denying intelligence about Taliban and Al Qaida leaders. A few assassination attempts on Musharraf served as a reminder that double dealing didn’t make either side happy.[vi]

                By 2003, the Taliban had regrouped and returned to Afghanistan in the Helmand and Zabul provinces, but the distraction of Iraq proved too much to deal with, and the Taliban escaped an initial fight and were able to grow stronger. They named Quetta in Pakistan as their new capital.  Despite their fortuitous opportunity for growth, they were no more advanced in policy or practice as they were ten years earlier.[vii] Regardless, the US was too complacent with dealing with the Taliban at the opportune time, and instead would find themselves still facing the Taliban ten years later in 2001.

            The 1947 dispute over the Durand Line resulted in several tribal areas being designated as autonomous from the Pakistani government, though the territory does not belong to Afghanistan. These politically ambiguous but religiously fundamental tribal areas, called FATAs (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), became the new headquarters of the Taliban and Al Qaida after they were initially driven out of Afghanistan in 2001[viii] One of the most dangerous of the tribal areas is South Waziristan, which became Al Qaida’s first sanctuary, which protected them not only from the US on the Afghanistan side, but also from Pakistan under heavy American influence on the Pakistan side. A Pakistani move against Al Qaida failed disastrously in 2004, partly because Al Qaida is so well hidden in plain sight in Waziristan, and also partly due to cooperation with Al Qaida within the ranks of the Pakistani military and the ISI.[ix] Minimal US involvement or access to the area was also a big help to all Islamist forces, causing bad blood between Karzai and Musharraf as well, because of the failure to act in response to the threats coming out of the FATAs. Nearly all modern Al Qaida linked terrorist plots come out of these tribal areas. Pakistan stopped looking for Bin Laden after 2004 due to less pressure from the US because the Americans were preoccupied in Iraq. This decrease in effort led to a resurgence of Al Qaida during the years the US was in Iraq.[x] Despite the other failures of Musharraf in this era, he managed to make peace with India, and prevent another front in Kashmir, which Pakistan could probably have not survived with any sort of stability. This is especially important because of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, which demand stability to remain undetonated.

Viewings- “Afghanistan – the Forgotten War”   

“The forgotten War” picks up the fight in Afghanistan when they begin to change their strategy and attempt to win more Afghan support, restart the economy, and push out the Taliban. It is an effort that requires marines to go in as a military force, but once they clear the place, to turn into peacekeeping forces. That transition is often difficult to make, especially since they start out by destroying what it is they want to build. The fighting itself seems oddly quiet; there are a few small skirmishes that consist of an entire team of US soldiers fighting off a few lone Taliban fighters. They are adopting the clear-hold-build strategy that was first piloted in Iraq, to some effect, but winning over the hearts of people is not easy. In reality, the locals are correct in saying that we are doing the same thing Russia did in the 70s by trying to show how they are coming as friends, but are a destructive force nonetheless. Wasn’t that what we were trying to avoid?

“Behind Taliban Lines”    

“Behind Taliban Lines” follows an Afghan journalist who lived as a Taliban fighter for several weeks and documented their daily lives. The group was Hezbi Islami, a fringe extremist group with strong ties to the Taliban. The fighters in the group come from all over the Islamic world, especially Yemen and Saudi Arabia. They have worked together with the Taliban and Al Qaida to fight coalition forces. They do have a legitimate point when they argue that the Americans imposed westernization on them, even though it started with the British. The Afghani locals support them because the Hezbi Islami fighters don’t harm them, their property, or their livestock. The same cannot be said for the Afghani government officials, who are notoriously corrupt.

            The culture of these groups is markedly different from any type of military force Americans might have experience with. The fighters prepare for martyrdom each time they fight. In their villages, children play with piles of grenades and guns all around them. It breeds violence, or at least as lack of fear in these children from a young age. And though they expect and even pray for death each time, they have overconfidence in their abilities. Their abilities are minimal, their organization fairly scattered and inefficient, and their bomb engineering not particularly sophisticated. Yet they deserve this overconfidence because they are willing to do anything for their cause, which is more than can be said for any American fighter despite the fact that freedom and safety may be their comparative ideological cause. Recklessness and stupidity have a high death toll, but they also often see success.

“The Secret War” / “Fighting for Bin Laden”

“The Secret War” discusses the CIA funded Afghan militias that operate along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. They are called the KPF, and are completely armed and run by the CIA. Their objective is to control the border by preventing Taliban and Al Qaida from crossing it. The KPF was formed in response to the problem of Pakistan’s double dealing. The Pakistani Army virtually openly supports the Taliban and Al Qaida, so the US could not rely on Pakistani officials to patrol the border. The Taliban depend on Pakistani support, and they are harbored in Pakistan, especially the Hakani network, a major branch of the Taliban with close ties to Al Qaida who are openly supported by the ISI. It is widely believed that Pakistan knew Bin Laden was hiding there from a great deal of circumstantial evidence. It would be nearly impossible for someone to not know that he was in Pakistan, not far from the capital. It seem about time that someone dealt with Pakistan’s double dealing, but there are other interests in Pakistan that may be more important than justice. The stability of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is a number one priority.

            In recent years Al Qaida has been slowly returning to Afghanistan, but it is unclear how many have returned or how powerful they are. They have strongholds in the nearly impenetrable Hindu Kush Mountains. A journalist went to live with them for a few weeks. Al Qaida seems to be fairly okay with allowing filming and journalists presumably because it gets their message out. The groups themselves, aside from their obvious caution with regard to outsiders, have a hospitality that is indicative of Afghan culture that the Americans will never be able to recreate. This may be some of the secret to their success in regard to winning over the local populace, but of course fear is also an excellent motivator. Like many others we have seen, this collection of fighters come from a wide variety of backgrounds including Chechens, Uzbeks, Arabs, Tajiks, Bosnians, etc. They fight not for a country or the Taliban but for Al Qaida by swearing a personal oath to Bin Laden.
           
            Their infiltration into the system is remarkable. They act as a local government and education system in addition to fighting Jihad. All the boys in their area are schooled in a local madrassa where they begin training to become Al Qaida as young as nine years old. They learn now to clean guns and make bombs instead of math and reading. With this kind of perpetual motion device of bringing in new fighters to replace the martyred ones, there is no way they will ever have a shortage of willing members, especially ones that have been conditioned since a young age to spout the ideological beliefs of Bin Laden and his supporters.
           
            Nevertheless a lot of what they preach, especially in front of the camera, is less than reliable. This includes the source of their weapons (likely China, not Iran) to the stories they tell about fighting Americans and even in some cases probably to the stories about how coalition forces have stolen their livestock and rape their women (though there is no telling if these actions are beyond the Afghan government, I find it hard to believe that this could be widespread in the American military forces). It is difficult to tell the strength and depth of their propaganda machine. There is no telling if they threatened or lied to the villagers who are interviewed about the supposed doings of Americans and coalition forces. A lot of their stories don’t match up. Despite their ideological fire, they all seem fairly relaxed. They are regular people who fight life and death missions every day. The important point from this, though, is that Al Qaida is no stronger or closer to their goals now than they were ten years ago. Their predicted result of 9/11, that it would force the US to pull out of the Middle East, was a gross miscalculation.



[i] Rashid 197
[ii] Rashid 205
[iii] Rashid 218
[iv] Rashid 222
[v] Rashid 229
[vi] Rashid 233
[vii] Rashid 251
[viii] Rashid 265
[ix] Rashid 271
[x] Rashid 282