Reaction Paper #6

Readings- Rashid Chapters 10-13

            At a G8 conference in 2002, the US said that they would not participate in nation building in Afghanistan. They lied.[i] Soon the US was setting up a government, military, and police force. Provincial Reconstruction Teams were set up later as well, but proved to be ineffective, and equally as difficult to execute as setting up the government institutions. A lack of funding was a major cause, either because there wasn’t enough money to start or the money was misappropriated.[ii] The government has multiple factions and inconsistencies which result in an inefficiency bordering on anarchy to go along with the growing corruption within the state bureaucracy. It’s been discussed before that the president, Hamid Karzai, has no power outside Kabul, and minimal mandate throughout the country. Despite all of these roadblocks, a constitution was adopted in 2004.[iii] However, this constitution might not be the best for Afghanistan. Written with heavy western influence, it does not take into enough consideration the cultural history of the country, and its policies contribute to the displeasure of the Afghani populace, which in turn drives more and more to supporting the Taliban.

            The ridiculous double dealing of Pakistan emerges almost from the beginning of the fighting in Afghanistan in late 2001 an early 2002. The ISI continue nearly open support for the Taliban, and other groups associated with them as well as Al Qaida.[iv] In addition to the ISI, the Islamic political parties have also shown support for the Taliban, and continue to deny the existence of Al Qaida completely, maintaining that 9/11 was carried out by the CIA and Israel. Musharraf did not contradict them.[v] Coalition forces quickly realized that Pakistani military support would be more hindrance than help, because of their support of the enemy, in aiding border crossings, turning a blind eye to blatant Taliban and Al Qaida efforts, and refusing to share intelligence or denying intelligence about Taliban and Al Qaida leaders. A few assassination attempts on Musharraf served as a reminder that double dealing didn’t make either side happy.[vi]

                By 2003, the Taliban had regrouped and returned to Afghanistan in the Helmand and Zabul provinces, but the distraction of Iraq proved too much to deal with, and the Taliban escaped an initial fight and were able to grow stronger. They named Quetta in Pakistan as their new capital.  Despite their fortuitous opportunity for growth, they were no more advanced in policy or practice as they were ten years earlier.[vii] Regardless, the US was too complacent with dealing with the Taliban at the opportune time, and instead would find themselves still facing the Taliban ten years later in 2001.

            The 1947 dispute over the Durand Line resulted in several tribal areas being designated as autonomous from the Pakistani government, though the territory does not belong to Afghanistan. These politically ambiguous but religiously fundamental tribal areas, called FATAs (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), became the new headquarters of the Taliban and Al Qaida after they were initially driven out of Afghanistan in 2001[viii] One of the most dangerous of the tribal areas is South Waziristan, which became Al Qaida’s first sanctuary, which protected them not only from the US on the Afghanistan side, but also from Pakistan under heavy American influence on the Pakistan side. A Pakistani move against Al Qaida failed disastrously in 2004, partly because Al Qaida is so well hidden in plain sight in Waziristan, and also partly due to cooperation with Al Qaida within the ranks of the Pakistani military and the ISI.[ix] Minimal US involvement or access to the area was also a big help to all Islamist forces, causing bad blood between Karzai and Musharraf as well, because of the failure to act in response to the threats coming out of the FATAs. Nearly all modern Al Qaida linked terrorist plots come out of these tribal areas. Pakistan stopped looking for Bin Laden after 2004 due to less pressure from the US because the Americans were preoccupied in Iraq. This decrease in effort led to a resurgence of Al Qaida during the years the US was in Iraq.[x] Despite the other failures of Musharraf in this era, he managed to make peace with India, and prevent another front in Kashmir, which Pakistan could probably have not survived with any sort of stability. This is especially important because of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, which demand stability to remain undetonated.

Viewings- “Afghanistan – the Forgotten War”   

“The forgotten War” picks up the fight in Afghanistan when they begin to change their strategy and attempt to win more Afghan support, restart the economy, and push out the Taliban. It is an effort that requires marines to go in as a military force, but once they clear the place, to turn into peacekeeping forces. That transition is often difficult to make, especially since they start out by destroying what it is they want to build. The fighting itself seems oddly quiet; there are a few small skirmishes that consist of an entire team of US soldiers fighting off a few lone Taliban fighters. They are adopting the clear-hold-build strategy that was first piloted in Iraq, to some effect, but winning over the hearts of people is not easy. In reality, the locals are correct in saying that we are doing the same thing Russia did in the 70s by trying to show how they are coming as friends, but are a destructive force nonetheless. Wasn’t that what we were trying to avoid?

“Behind Taliban Lines”    

“Behind Taliban Lines” follows an Afghan journalist who lived as a Taliban fighter for several weeks and documented their daily lives. The group was Hezbi Islami, a fringe extremist group with strong ties to the Taliban. The fighters in the group come from all over the Islamic world, especially Yemen and Saudi Arabia. They have worked together with the Taliban and Al Qaida to fight coalition forces. They do have a legitimate point when they argue that the Americans imposed westernization on them, even though it started with the British. The Afghani locals support them because the Hezbi Islami fighters don’t harm them, their property, or their livestock. The same cannot be said for the Afghani government officials, who are notoriously corrupt.

            The culture of these groups is markedly different from any type of military force Americans might have experience with. The fighters prepare for martyrdom each time they fight. In their villages, children play with piles of grenades and guns all around them. It breeds violence, or at least as lack of fear in these children from a young age. And though they expect and even pray for death each time, they have overconfidence in their abilities. Their abilities are minimal, their organization fairly scattered and inefficient, and their bomb engineering not particularly sophisticated. Yet they deserve this overconfidence because they are willing to do anything for their cause, which is more than can be said for any American fighter despite the fact that freedom and safety may be their comparative ideological cause. Recklessness and stupidity have a high death toll, but they also often see success.

“The Secret War” / “Fighting for Bin Laden”

“The Secret War” discusses the CIA funded Afghan militias that operate along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. They are called the KPF, and are completely armed and run by the CIA. Their objective is to control the border by preventing Taliban and Al Qaida from crossing it. The KPF was formed in response to the problem of Pakistan’s double dealing. The Pakistani Army virtually openly supports the Taliban and Al Qaida, so the US could not rely on Pakistani officials to patrol the border. The Taliban depend on Pakistani support, and they are harbored in Pakistan, especially the Hakani network, a major branch of the Taliban with close ties to Al Qaida who are openly supported by the ISI. It is widely believed that Pakistan knew Bin Laden was hiding there from a great deal of circumstantial evidence. It would be nearly impossible for someone to not know that he was in Pakistan, not far from the capital. It seem about time that someone dealt with Pakistan’s double dealing, but there are other interests in Pakistan that may be more important than justice. The stability of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is a number one priority.

            In recent years Al Qaida has been slowly returning to Afghanistan, but it is unclear how many have returned or how powerful they are. They have strongholds in the nearly impenetrable Hindu Kush Mountains. A journalist went to live with them for a few weeks. Al Qaida seems to be fairly okay with allowing filming and journalists presumably because it gets their message out. The groups themselves, aside from their obvious caution with regard to outsiders, have a hospitality that is indicative of Afghan culture that the Americans will never be able to recreate. This may be some of the secret to their success in regard to winning over the local populace, but of course fear is also an excellent motivator. Like many others we have seen, this collection of fighters come from a wide variety of backgrounds including Chechens, Uzbeks, Arabs, Tajiks, Bosnians, etc. They fight not for a country or the Taliban but for Al Qaida by swearing a personal oath to Bin Laden.

           

            Their infiltration into the system is remarkable. They act as a local government and education system in addition to fighting Jihad. All the boys in their area are schooled in a local madrassa where they begin training to become Al Qaida as young as nine years old. They learn now to clean guns and make bombs instead of math and reading. With this kind of perpetual motion device of bringing in new fighters to replace the martyred ones, there is no way they will ever have a shortage of willing members, especially ones that have been conditioned since a young age to spout the ideological beliefs of Bin Laden and his supporters.

           

            Nevertheless a lot of what they preach, especially in front of the camera, is less than reliable. This includes the source of their weapons (likely China, not Iran) to the stories they tell about fighting Americans and even in some cases probably to the stories about how coalition forces have stolen their livestock and rape their women (though there is no telling if these actions are beyond the Afghan government, I find it hard to believe that this could be widespread in the American military forces). It is difficult to tell the strength and depth of their propaganda machine. There is no telling if they threatened or lied to the villagers who are interviewed about the supposed doings of Americans and coalition forces. A lot of their stories don’t match up. Despite their ideological fire, they all seem fairly relaxed. They are regular people who fight life and death missions every day. The important point from this, though, is that Al Qaida is no stronger or closer to their goals now than they were ten years ago. Their predicted result of 9/11, that it would force the US to pull out of the Middle East, was a gross miscalculation.

---

[i] Rashid 197

[ii] Rashid 205

[iii] Rashid 218

[iv] Rashid 222

[v] Rashid 229

[vi] Rashid 233

[vii] Rashid 251

[viii] Rashid 265

[ix] Rashid 271

[x] Rashid 282