Reaction Paper #7

Readings: Rashid Chapters 14 and 15

Rashid makes it clear in Chapter 14 that the disregard for the Geneva Conventions was a major blow to US policy and international relations. The treatment of POWs is a serious issue in a post 9/11 world because the US is not fighting a country; they are fighting a collective group of people without national borders or laws. Al Qaida certainly never signed the Geneva conventions, so an argument can be made that the Geneva Conventions do not apply. However, this would be an irresponsible and anachronistic interpretation of the conventions. The US had a great opportunity to set a precedent for the role of the Geneva Conventions in modern warfare, but they squandered this opportunity with Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and the CIA network of foreign prisons. The neoconservative project of expanding the authority of the executive branch put the State Department, foreign policy and the Geneva Conventions second[i]. The Department of Defense and CIA were put first. In doing so, they set a precedent of war being the predominant international force instead of peaceful diplomacy. Very quickly, other countries like Pakistan began following the US’s lead in the treatment of POWs with disastrous results. The rampant human rights abuses in the region are the result of this ‘war first’ policy.[ii]

                In Chapter 15, Rashid moves on to the drug issues in the region. Afghanistan is the world’s largest producer of opiates, particularly the Helmand region. War is the primary cause of such rampant poppy production. The economy cannot support many other jobs, and the poppy industry funds the war, both for the northern alliance and for the Taliban and Al Qaida, so when war and terrorism thrive so does the poppy industry. The US and UK have not been able to address the poppy cultivation issue.[iii] But the blame also rests on the current Afghan government, especially Karzai.[iv] It is a complicated situation because poppy cultivation is a means of livelihood for many Afghan citizens, and it is extremely difficult to expand into other crops that are worth much less when sold. More about the drug trade will be discussed when I talk about “Bitter Harvest”.

Viewings: “The Dancing Boys of Afghanistan” – Frontline

                This documentary investigated the practice of Bacha Bazi in Afghanistan. Bacha Bazi translates to mean “boy play”; it’s a means of sex slavery of young boys in Afghanistan. It’s relevant to us now because of the recent events at Penn State. In a sense it has hit close to home. The history of Bacha Bazi goes back rather far in Afghanistan, though it is banned by both the Taliban and the Afghanistan government. It has a lot of similarities to the prostitution industry in America and Europe of women, except that here they are young boys, usually aged 9-16 or so. The boys are poor and are effectively purchased by wealthy warlords and business men as dancers. They dress in women’s clothing and dance for a gathering of wealthy men, not unlike a strip club in the US. They even sell DVDs of it on the streets. The entertainment is merely a pretense for the sexual acts that occur later. It is child abuse and rape- but what is the alternative for these boys? They earn money for their families this way. Again similar to the prostitutes on the streets in the US, they feel they have no other choice.

The Practice originated in Pakistan, and came to Afghanistan as a way to cope with war while soldiers were away in battle, particularly when fighting the Russians in the 80s. There is too much similar activity of pedophilia and illicit sex in the west to argue that it is simply a cultural difference. It could be argued that these men are like all men- men go to strip clubs and try to sleep with prostitutes all the time in western countries, the only difference in this case is the gender; even that (as Penn State proved) may not be that different (and that could just be a cultural difference--- must look at from the point of view of the culture). Since women are covered all the time, wandering eyes might go to young boys that still appear innocent and feminine. Furthermore it should be considered in the broader scope of Asian culture. The men who participate are all very rich and powerful – they must be to support all the boys. It’s a concubine type of culture that is fairly common throughout the history of Asia. They used young girls for such things all the time. Should there be a difference between them and young boys? Obviously that doesn’t make it right, but maybe we should be less surprised.

                The man in question in the video has two sons of his own, but he sees no connection between his sons and the boys he uses for sex. Perhaps it is a class or caste thing? Many of the men interviewed say they wouldn’t have sex with the boys if they didn’t want it—but they also say young boys want it a lot- probably out of fear that resisting could result in a beating or death. It is also possible that the hypothetical lack of resistance is psychological, or they are abusing the high hormone levels of teenage boys who have been exposed to the Bacha Bazi culture from a very young age and may not know any alternative.

The police do not stop the practices even though it is illegal. The police say that if anyone is caught in the act they will be punished—but they don’t actually do it. They are easily bribed and often participate in the practice themselves. The Chief of the youth crime department and the chief investigator of police in that area both participate in these activities. Furthermore, a lot of references to drinking and alcohol are present- but isn’t drinking alcohol against Islam? How do they reconcile that with their beliefs? Bacha Bazi is very taboo in the country—no one talks about it, but research by the UN shows that it is actually fairly widespread throughout the country, and has made a comeback since the fall of the Taliban. These young boys need income, and many have no other way of making money for their families. If they are raised this way what else would they know? Even boys who grew up as dancers talk of having their own boys one day, thus it is very hard to stop the cycle. It can be very dangerous for boys—masters have been known to beat or kill boys that disobey or attempt to run away. Trying to rescue them may put them in even more danger.

“Bitter Harvest” – PBS Wide Angle

70% of the world’s opium and heroin is grown in Afghanistan. Opium production has tripled since the fall of Taliban, overflowing into the rest of central Asia. Recently, since the destruction of the already precarious Afghan economy, Opium has become the only source of income in the country in a place where war has torn apart all other industries. It has funded the military campaigns on both sides for a long time. The farmers themselves don’t even make that much money from growing poppy. The big profits are for smugglers, who can get the drugs from the labs in northern Afghanistan to the markets in Europe and the Americas. Over 200 drug labs are thought to be hidden in the mountains in northern Afghanistan. Putting a stop to such a widespread organization is particularly difficult because there are no other reliable jobs in a country torn apart by war.

Drug control is financed by the UN, not the governments of the individual countries. Trying to stop transport across the afghan border is difficult for the UN with some collaboration from the national militaries because the drug smugglers are smarter and better funded than the border patrol. The topography of the area makes it especially difficult to police, even though there are still Russian forces policing in some areas. But it is hard and dangerous work for both the smugglers and the border patrol. The drugs are worth a lot more once they cross the border into Tajikistan and even more once they make it to Europe.  One truck load can be worth over $25 million on the streets of Europe. Everyone involved that was interviewed cited poverty as their reason for getting involved in the drug trade (and war is a large cause of the widespread poverty). Widespread corruption doesn’t help either. Authorities in Uzbekistan have been known to plant drugs and illegal literature on people they want to arrest for disagreeing with the Authoritarian dictatorship.

The drug trade supports terrorism, and the instability in Afghanistan causes instability in the entire region directly because of drugs. It is difficult to improve productivity, education, and peace when a large portion of the youth in a given country is addicted to heroin. The drug is literally destroying countries in its path to Europe. Ironically, it’s the same Silk Road that Marco Polo used to open up the economy of Europe to Asia. Now those roads are being used for destructive purposes.

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[i] Rashid 293

[ii] Rashid 311

[iii] Rashid 325

[iv] Rashid 331

Reaction Paper #6

Readings- Rashid Chapters 10-13

            At a G8 conference in 2002, the US said that they would not participate in nation building in Afghanistan. They lied.[i] Soon the US was setting up a government, military, and police force. Provincial Reconstruction Teams were set up later as well, but proved to be ineffective, and equally as difficult to execute as setting up the government institutions. A lack of funding was a major cause, either because there wasn’t enough money to start or the money was misappropriated.[ii] The government has multiple factions and inconsistencies which result in an inefficiency bordering on anarchy to go along with the growing corruption within the state bureaucracy. It’s been discussed before that the president, Hamid Karzai, has no power outside Kabul, and minimal mandate throughout the country. Despite all of these roadblocks, a constitution was adopted in 2004.[iii] However, this constitution might not be the best for Afghanistan. Written with heavy western influence, it does not take into enough consideration the cultural history of the country, and its policies contribute to the displeasure of the Afghani populace, which in turn drives more and more to supporting the Taliban.

            The ridiculous double dealing of Pakistan emerges almost from the beginning of the fighting in Afghanistan in late 2001 an early 2002. The ISI continue nearly open support for the Taliban, and other groups associated with them as well as Al Qaida.[iv] In addition to the ISI, the Islamic political parties have also shown support for the Taliban, and continue to deny the existence of Al Qaida completely, maintaining that 9/11 was carried out by the CIA and Israel. Musharraf did not contradict them.[v] Coalition forces quickly realized that Pakistani military support would be more hindrance than help, because of their support of the enemy, in aiding border crossings, turning a blind eye to blatant Taliban and Al Qaida efforts, and refusing to share intelligence or denying intelligence about Taliban and Al Qaida leaders. A few assassination attempts on Musharraf served as a reminder that double dealing didn’t make either side happy.[vi]

                By 2003, the Taliban had regrouped and returned to Afghanistan in the Helmand and Zabul provinces, but the distraction of Iraq proved too much to deal with, and the Taliban escaped an initial fight and were able to grow stronger. They named Quetta in Pakistan as their new capital.  Despite their fortuitous opportunity for growth, they were no more advanced in policy or practice as they were ten years earlier.[vii] Regardless, the US was too complacent with dealing with the Taliban at the opportune time, and instead would find themselves still facing the Taliban ten years later in 2001.

            The 1947 dispute over the Durand Line resulted in several tribal areas being designated as autonomous from the Pakistani government, though the territory does not belong to Afghanistan. These politically ambiguous but religiously fundamental tribal areas, called FATAs (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), became the new headquarters of the Taliban and Al Qaida after they were initially driven out of Afghanistan in 2001[viii] One of the most dangerous of the tribal areas is South Waziristan, which became Al Qaida’s first sanctuary, which protected them not only from the US on the Afghanistan side, but also from Pakistan under heavy American influence on the Pakistan side. A Pakistani move against Al Qaida failed disastrously in 2004, partly because Al Qaida is so well hidden in plain sight in Waziristan, and also partly due to cooperation with Al Qaida within the ranks of the Pakistani military and the ISI.[ix] Minimal US involvement or access to the area was also a big help to all Islamist forces, causing bad blood between Karzai and Musharraf as well, because of the failure to act in response to the threats coming out of the FATAs. Nearly all modern Al Qaida linked terrorist plots come out of these tribal areas. Pakistan stopped looking for Bin Laden after 2004 due to less pressure from the US because the Americans were preoccupied in Iraq. This decrease in effort led to a resurgence of Al Qaida during the years the US was in Iraq.[x] Despite the other failures of Musharraf in this era, he managed to make peace with India, and prevent another front in Kashmir, which Pakistan could probably have not survived with any sort of stability. This is especially important because of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, which demand stability to remain undetonated.

Viewings- “Afghanistan – the Forgotten War”   

“The forgotten War” picks up the fight in Afghanistan when they begin to change their strategy and attempt to win more Afghan support, restart the economy, and push out the Taliban. It is an effort that requires marines to go in as a military force, but once they clear the place, to turn into peacekeeping forces. That transition is often difficult to make, especially since they start out by destroying what it is they want to build. The fighting itself seems oddly quiet; there are a few small skirmishes that consist of an entire team of US soldiers fighting off a few lone Taliban fighters. They are adopting the clear-hold-build strategy that was first piloted in Iraq, to some effect, but winning over the hearts of people is not easy. In reality, the locals are correct in saying that we are doing the same thing Russia did in the 70s by trying to show how they are coming as friends, but are a destructive force nonetheless. Wasn’t that what we were trying to avoid?

“Behind Taliban Lines”    

“Behind Taliban Lines” follows an Afghan journalist who lived as a Taliban fighter for several weeks and documented their daily lives. The group was Hezbi Islami, a fringe extremist group with strong ties to the Taliban. The fighters in the group come from all over the Islamic world, especially Yemen and Saudi Arabia. They have worked together with the Taliban and Al Qaida to fight coalition forces. They do have a legitimate point when they argue that the Americans imposed westernization on them, even though it started with the British. The Afghani locals support them because the Hezbi Islami fighters don’t harm them, their property, or their livestock. The same cannot be said for the Afghani government officials, who are notoriously corrupt.

            The culture of these groups is markedly different from any type of military force Americans might have experience with. The fighters prepare for martyrdom each time they fight. In their villages, children play with piles of grenades and guns all around them. It breeds violence, or at least as lack of fear in these children from a young age. And though they expect and even pray for death each time, they have overconfidence in their abilities. Their abilities are minimal, their organization fairly scattered and inefficient, and their bomb engineering not particularly sophisticated. Yet they deserve this overconfidence because they are willing to do anything for their cause, which is more than can be said for any American fighter despite the fact that freedom and safety may be their comparative ideological cause. Recklessness and stupidity have a high death toll, but they also often see success.

“The Secret War” / “Fighting for Bin Laden”

“The Secret War” discusses the CIA funded Afghan militias that operate along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. They are called the KPF, and are completely armed and run by the CIA. Their objective is to control the border by preventing Taliban and Al Qaida from crossing it. The KPF was formed in response to the problem of Pakistan’s double dealing. The Pakistani Army virtually openly supports the Taliban and Al Qaida, so the US could not rely on Pakistani officials to patrol the border. The Taliban depend on Pakistani support, and they are harbored in Pakistan, especially the Hakani network, a major branch of the Taliban with close ties to Al Qaida who are openly supported by the ISI. It is widely believed that Pakistan knew Bin Laden was hiding there from a great deal of circumstantial evidence. It would be nearly impossible for someone to not know that he was in Pakistan, not far from the capital. It seem about time that someone dealt with Pakistan’s double dealing, but there are other interests in Pakistan that may be more important than justice. The stability of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is a number one priority.

            In recent years Al Qaida has been slowly returning to Afghanistan, but it is unclear how many have returned or how powerful they are. They have strongholds in the nearly impenetrable Hindu Kush Mountains. A journalist went to live with them for a few weeks. Al Qaida seems to be fairly okay with allowing filming and journalists presumably because it gets their message out. The groups themselves, aside from their obvious caution with regard to outsiders, have a hospitality that is indicative of Afghan culture that the Americans will never be able to recreate. This may be some of the secret to their success in regard to winning over the local populace, but of course fear is also an excellent motivator. Like many others we have seen, this collection of fighters come from a wide variety of backgrounds including Chechens, Uzbeks, Arabs, Tajiks, Bosnians, etc. They fight not for a country or the Taliban but for Al Qaida by swearing a personal oath to Bin Laden.

           

            Their infiltration into the system is remarkable. They act as a local government and education system in addition to fighting Jihad. All the boys in their area are schooled in a local madrassa where they begin training to become Al Qaida as young as nine years old. They learn now to clean guns and make bombs instead of math and reading. With this kind of perpetual motion device of bringing in new fighters to replace the martyred ones, there is no way they will ever have a shortage of willing members, especially ones that have been conditioned since a young age to spout the ideological beliefs of Bin Laden and his supporters.

           

            Nevertheless a lot of what they preach, especially in front of the camera, is less than reliable. This includes the source of their weapons (likely China, not Iran) to the stories they tell about fighting Americans and even in some cases probably to the stories about how coalition forces have stolen their livestock and rape their women (though there is no telling if these actions are beyond the Afghan government, I find it hard to believe that this could be widespread in the American military forces). It is difficult to tell the strength and depth of their propaganda machine. There is no telling if they threatened or lied to the villagers who are interviewed about the supposed doings of Americans and coalition forces. A lot of their stories don’t match up. Despite their ideological fire, they all seem fairly relaxed. They are regular people who fight life and death missions every day. The important point from this, though, is that Al Qaida is no stronger or closer to their goals now than they were ten years ago. Their predicted result of 9/11, that it would force the US to pull out of the Middle East, was a gross miscalculation.

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[i] Rashid 197

[ii] Rashid 205

[iii] Rashid 218

[iv] Rashid 222

[v] Rashid 229

[vi] Rashid 233

[vii] Rashid 251

[viii] Rashid 265

[ix] Rashid 271

[x] Rashid 282

Reaction Paper #5

Readings: “Descent into Chaos” Chapters 7-9

            This part of “Descent into Chaos” focuses on Afghanistan immediately after full combat operations ended in 2002. In the aftermath there was a precarious shift of power. The US needed to hand over a government to the country, but none existed. Instead, Rumsfeld and the Department of Defense decided to hand over governing power to the autonomous tribal leaders. The first major problem if this method was that most of the leaders had ties with the Taliban. This warlord authority Rashid considered to be Rumsfeld’s most fatal mistake. Rumsfeld had almost unlimited power in this regard, and he acted independently of the rest of the administration. However, he used the CIA’s $1 Billion Budget to fund the warlords. In retrospect it was clear that he was really indirectly just funding Taliban leaders, and was holding back and even reversing Afghan reconstruction. In June 2002 Karzai was elected President by a Loya Jirga in Germany.[i] He still had no power, however, because at this point the military had only secured Kabul, and had no political control over the rest of the country. To this day, Karzai is still only a glorified Mayor of Kabul.

            In Pakistan, Musharraf continued toeing the line between the Taliban and The US.  The ISI continued to be somewhat lukewarm in its support of the US while conducting double dealings with Al Qaida leaders in Afghanistan and the tribal regions of Pakistan. They were attempting to secure their survival whichever way the chips fell. It should have been clear to them that the US would refuse to stop until it achieved victory or it didn’t have any soldiers left (proof lies in Vietnam) so it was more in their interest to completely support the US in their endeavors even if it only meant that the US would be out of there sooner. But ideology drives a hard bargain. The Taliban and Al Qaida mindsets had so infiltrated the ISI by this point that they were practically the same group. [ii] This was clear especially in the Killing of Daniel Pearl in 2002 and the wave of terror attacks that followed. [iii] Their anti-American party called Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal flourished in Pakistan, though the Political system there is basically the ISI, it is highly doubtful that, had there been fair and free elections un-tampered with by the government, the same outcome would have occurred. Because of the uncooperative actions of Pakistan, the US expanded their bases in the region Central Asia to other countries, especially Uzbekistan.[iv]

            President Bush missed his opportunity for nation building because his leadership skills were lacking. He let a key directive expire that would have enacted an interagency process to rebuild Afghanistan.[v]  Despite the minor success of a few programs, the real hindrances were the CIA and DOD and their failure to cooperate with one another.[vi] If our own US government cannot coordinate together within itself or with other NATO or UN countries to solve a key problem threatening the safety of the US military, and by extension the American people, then I have no idea how they ever expected to have any success building another nation with Afghanistan’s history and political and social climate.[vii]

Viewings: “Kill/Capture” – PBS Frontline

            On May 2^nd, 2011, The US Special Operatives of Team 6, part of the Joint Special Operations Command had one of the highest profile successes of the Kill/Capture program since its inception. They raided a compound in Pakistan and killed Osama Bin Laden. Kill/Capture was a US strategy devised to keep the enemy on the run and to prevent them from gaining any stronghold territory. Under this system more than 12,000 militants per year have been either killed or are in US custody. But sometimes intelligence is wrong, and sometimes they raid the homes of supporters by accident. Not only does that result in the death of innocent people, but it makes locals dislike the US military. Especially Afghan soldiers who are ashamed to raid the homes of tribal elders. What the overall strategy is trying to do is make friends with the local people to isolate the insurgents, but is that what they’re really doing?

The US military believes in killing people, but only the right people. They are getting better and better at identifying and isolating the real enemy: the individual terrorist members of Al Qaida. General McChrystal increased kill/capture missions and Petraeus continued to use them even more frequently. The raids themselves are mostly run by JSOC Special Forces such as the Navy Seals or 101^st Airborne because they exist outside of NATO limits. This leaves conventional forces to secure populace, theoretically. It has worked in many places- there’s no more Taliban in many towns in Afghanistan. Still many feel it is offensive and violates Islamic values, traditions, and code by violating women and breaking and entering. Even the most US- friendly Afghan soldiers oppose night raids because they feel it is offensive in their country. The US army tries to reduce offense by using locals from the Afghan army instead of Americans.

 It even goes so far to make some support the Taliban instead. Many tribal elders and small militias have either returned to Taliban control or are openly sympathetic to the Taliban. An even bigger problem is when the US makes a mistake. One time, a drone missile hit an election convoy instead of the terrorists. The US military maintained that they had killed the right person, but there is no way to oversee if they make a mistake. Just because they think someone is a terrorist, doesn’t mean they’re right – intelligence mistakes cost lives. Furthermore, they don’t have to approve their targets with the government in Kabul, so there are some mistakes that could have been avoided by including the Kabul government in their decisions. More mistakes mean more Afghans will go to the Taliban side. Lots of Taliban are being killed successfully but there are always more Taliban soldiers waiting to take over. It’s impossible to get rid of people that are ready and willing to die anyway, with nearly unlimited human resources. And the more the US makes ordinary citizens the victims, the more support the Taliban will get. Even people who left the Taliban regret doing so, because the Kabul government can’t support them monetarily like the Taliban could. Both sides, the independent militias on the government side and the ones that openly support the Taliban, seem to think the Americans are the infidels instead.

 “Return of the Taliban” – PBS Frontline

           

After the Taliban and Al Qaida were driven out of Afghanistan in 2001, they regrouped in Peshawar, on the border of the tribal territories in Pakistan. These areas now have full Taliban influence, since the tribal areas operate autonomously from the Pakistani state. Here, the Taliban have regrouped and reformed, and Pakistan is doing almost nothing to stop them. Nor does it appear to want to. Musharraf attempts to play both sides by supporting the US, while allowing the ISI almost complete power to support the Taliban so as not to alienate his political support. This kind of toeing the line is only possible for a very short while. In the tribal regions the support for the Taliban and Al Qaida is completely open. Mosques even held collections to support the groups when the US first went into Afghanistan and collected gold, silver, cash, and weapons.

Pakistan did not cooperate with US completely at first or for awhile after the start of the war – to could have possibly been the final thing that undermined the US’s whole Afghanistan mission and could explain why the US is still fighting in Afghanistan ten years later. Pakistan has basically cut their own deals with Al Qaida and the Taliban under the US’s nose. The introduction of suicide bombing and Arab money into the Taliban and Al Qaida can largely be blamed on Pakistan effectively supporting them throughout the whole game. When it comes down to it, it appears Pashtun brotherhood is stronger than any political system. But that doesn’t mean they want the general Pakistani or American public to know about their double dealing. Hayat Ullah was one of many journalists killed because he implicated the Pakistani government as supporting the Americans in drone bombings of Taliban leaders. He published images of found US missiles at the site of an explosion that killed a Taliban bomb maker. It disproved what the Pakistani government had originally stated- that it was an accidental explosion. It could have undermined Musharraf and the ISI’s dealings with the Taliban. Since then, Karzai has attempted to politically force Musharraf into full support of the US, but has been relatively unsuccessful until very recently. Even Bush attempted to force Musharraf, but Bush’s political skills were too lacking to win him over. Despite all of this Musharraf is still only reasonable ally in the region, and so the US is stuck with him for awhile.

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[i] Rashid 144

[ii] Rashid 151

[iii] Rashid 157

[iv] Rashid 168

[v] Rashid 173

[vi] Rashid 185

[vii] Rashid 195